陆广莘：卓尔不群 特立独行

但当你“触摸”到这位亲切慈善的老人的思维时，不得不佩服他卓尔不群的见解和特立独行的医学思想——中医临床有效但用实验方法证明无效，只能说明实验有问 题；医学不是科学，科学也不应成为霸权，医学不必拜倒在科学脚下，中医更是如此；中医的医学模式要比西医高明得多，决不是需要西医弯下腰来拉兄弟一把的境 况，也没有必要永远跟在人家后面跑；中医需要来一次思想上的大解放。

　　卓尔不群的医学见解

　　陆老笑称自己是少数派，不过他的医学观点正渐渐被哲学界、科学界、医学界所接受。而很多人也说，中医西医的学科特点、模式、发展等这些战略性的问题，还是去找陆老谈吧，他能把那一套东西说清楚。

　　要真正跟上陆老的思维、把他的观点弄清楚并不是一件容易的事，学识渊博、见解超前的陆老不仅会讲健康的医学、医学的健康，医学到底是什么？还会 脱口而出《吕氏春秋》、《周礼》、《毛泽东选集》、恩格斯、黑格尔的一些医学观点和《医学的目的国际研究计划》的报告，不仅讲“神转不回，回则不转”，还 会讲“生命的过程是以物质的依赖性为基础的自我独立性”。一会儿古代，一会儿现代，一会儿东方，一会儿西方，还会说出很多英语专业术语，记者的脑神经不停 旋转，也跟不上陆老敏锐而跳跃的思维。

　　◆陆老最根本的观点是中医要“循生生之道，助生生之气，用生生之具，谋生生之效。” 重视人体的这种很奇怪的、甚至是无可估量的自愈能力和生命活力。

　　◆基于这样的思想，陆老有一整套的主张，如养生是上工治未病，保健是中工防病，下工才治已病。

　　◆而治病时也多强调重视人体生生之气的诊疗模式，不是简单地杀病毒，也不能像西医学那样仅用化学和物理的方法来看待和治疗疾病。

　　◆中医不是问“病从何来”，更需问“治向何去”。

　　◆中医学这种研究人体各关系的学科，从生物进化史的角度看，要比从解剖和病毒病因上来简单地看待疾病的西医学高明而且也复杂。当代世界性的医疗危机，根本上在于只针对于疾病的现代医学模式。

　　◆那么，对待中医学，就应从物质科学认识论中解放出来，从疾病医学的认识论中解放出来，不能用“不知解剖定位、不知药性、不知治病机理”来否定中医这一人类高档的关系医学。

　　◆医学不能拜倒在科学的脚下，中医学更是如此。科学只是对事物分析性的认识论，是已经发生过去了的事情，而医学是实践，是道，是探索向哪里去的生生之道，不适合用科学来评价。探讨中医科学性没什么意义。

　　◆中医的研究也不能像西医那样拆开来研究，“器散则分之”，生命体被割裂开来，生化层次的东西就没有了。

　　◆中医的发展是创造性实践的生生之道，应“中学为体，西学为用” 。

　　特立独行的医学实践

　　陆老的经历使他对中医和西医、东方医学和西方医学有一个清醒的认识，看得很透。陆老1927年生于江苏，15岁考入高中工科，那时崇尚机械文明 的他也是瞧不起中医的。抗战后，他回家为学一技之长，先后拜陆渊雷、章次公、徐衡之为师，东西方文化的背景差异、有机论与机械论的观念冲突，中医关于目标 动力实践论和西医关于溯因分析认识论的巨大碰撞，是他初入中医之门、思维方式格格不入的重要原因。三位老师不仅给了他诊病的技术，更给了他高层次的指导思 想：在“发皇古义”基础上“融会新知”；欲求融合，必先求自我之卓然自立；对疾病的对抗疗法要“心知其意，不为所囿”。在老师的引领下，他后来渐渐改变了 对中医学的看法。

　　1952年，陆广莘考入卫生部中学西班，在北医系统学习西医时，他常常和老师的意见相左。

　　西医病理学老师说肝硬变→die(死亡)。陆老提出了不同的意见：在南方治过肝硬变，给他们治好了，其中一个女孩子还结婚生了孩子，肝硬变是可以逆转的。

　　上世纪60年代，陆广莘的脸上长出了蜘蛛痣，掌心变得发红，各种化验指标都说明他得了肝硬化。他开始了用自己的思路给自己治疗：一是相信肝脏的再生能力，二是阻止炎症的不断发生，三是减轻肝脏的负担，就这样他一步步好起来，到80年代初完全康复了。

　　1957年，陆广莘毕业分到中央人民医院中医科，在全国一流的西医院看了30年的病，组建了第一个西医院的中医病房，所以他非常了解西医和中医 的差别，中医不守旧、不迂腐，但中医不是万能的，西医也不是万能的。陆老的这一观点不只是感情上为中医振臂高呼，而是上升到一种学术的高度，后来明白他想 法的人都说他高瞻远瞩。

　　1963年，陆老发表了《王履医学思想》，王履指出对抗疗法的“治其旺气，是以反也”，就在于“粗工不知求属之道”的观点，由此他提出血压血糖 不应当是治疗对象，不赞成肝炎患者大量吃糖，再障大量输血，肾炎严格限盐，这一观念在文革中受到批判，被指责为把病人当试验品。

　　陆老早年在人民医院从事过乙脑、急腹症、肝炎、肝硬化、糖尿病、肾炎、高血压、哮喘的中西医治疗和观察，但后来没有着眼于一病一方的研究，而是从战略的高度彻底地思考了中医诊疗的本质和中西医医疗模式的不同。大道无术，也不知道一路独行的陆老有没有高处不胜寒的感觉？

　　1983年，陆老奉调中国中医科学院任中心实验室副主任，他倡导中医思路的基础理论研究，中心实验室后来发展为中医基础理论研究所。他提出了中医研究和研究中医互动并进的观点和“旁开一寸，更上一层”的研究策略。

　　法无定法的养生原则

　　陆老在生活中非常平易近人。今年82岁的陆老从相貌上看也就50岁左右，走路上楼下楼还两步一跳的，绝没有耄耋之年的老态龙钟。陆老的养生原则 是天道自然，百无禁忌。陆老是父亲老来得子，家里认为其先天不足，特让他吃百家奶长大。陆老从小就特别聪明和调皮，家里很娇宠，吃饭很慢，饭量很小，想吃 什么吃什么，想吃多少吃多少，到现在也一直是这样。一般认为鸡蛋黄胆固醇高，陆老不怕，他倒觉得鸡蛋是胚胎，很有营养，故每天吃上四个鸡蛋。

　　陆老自认为对自己的职业还是忠心耿耿的，他一直保持着年轻的容颜和体力，经常出差讲学，逢人便讲他那生生之道。

　　尽管谈的都是很高深的内容，但记者还是深受陆老感染，要知道，对于中医这样的学科，多少人怀疑，多少人迷惘，而学科本身又受到多少无端的指责。 陆老本着中医当卓然自立的民族精神，于高一层次上对中医学的俯瞰性明视，使后学者顿生自信，当然也使中医人茫然无助中寻得精神依靠。

健康医学中医大有可为----陆广莘先生

基于对医学本质的清晰认知，陆广莘教授指出，现代医学发展需要由疾病医学模式转向健康医学模式。而中医的理念正好契合了健康医学模式，因此在现代健康医学的发展过程中，中医将大有可为。

在接近三个小时的访谈时间里面，陆广莘教授声情并茂对上述观点进行了精彩的阐述。而其准确的记忆、清晰的思路、敏锐的反应，使人很难想象其已经是一位79岁的老人。

“中西医在医学目的上的追求有不同的侧重。”陆广莘如此向记者进行开场白。对于西方医学，他指出：“西方医学以疾病为研究对象，以病因、病理、病位为目标对象，进行疾病分类学知识体系的构架。它致力于向微观层次发展，期望能够努力发现疾病和确诊疾病，并致力于直接对抗性地消除病因、纠正病理、清除病灶，最终实现征服疾病和消灭疾病的目的。”

生理医学模式面临困境

对于这种医学模式，美国人G.L.恩格尔早在1977年就对其进行尖锐的批评。他指出：“今 天，统治着西方医学的疾病模型是生物医学模型。这种模型，已成为一种文化上的至上命令，即它现在已获得教条的地位。它认为，疾病的一切行为现象，必须用物 理和化学的原理来解释，这是还原论的办法。它认为，任何不能做如此解释的，必须从疾病的范畴中清除出去，这是排外主义的办法。它把敢于向生物医学疾病模型 这个终极提出疑问并主张建立更为有用的模型的人，视为异端。”

这种模式虽然非常重视技术，但随着时间的推移，其弊端也逐步开始显现。陆广莘指出：“疾病医学长期统治西方医学，除了导致药物淘汰加快、病毒变异加快、环境污染加剧之外，还导致了医疗费用大幅度上升，并由此形成了世界性的医疗危机。”

生物—心理—社会医学模式本质不变

正是基于上述认识，G.L.恩格尔提出了著名的“生物—心理—社会医学模式”。他认为，应该由生物医学向生物心理—社会—医学模型实行转变。“生物—心理—社会医学模式”极大的拓展了疾病医学的内涵，使其从纯粹的生物医学范畴扩展到生物、心理、社会范畴，重视了心理和社会因素在疾病治疗中的重要作用。

然而，追根究底，“生物—心理—社会医学模式”依然没有摆脱疾病医学教条的束缚，开始滞后于时代的发展：首先，最近半个世纪正是环境科学和生态科学大发展的重要时期，而该医学模式却无法体现环境与生态科学的最新成果，致使其审视健康、疾病和医学问题时缺乏时代的高度。其次，通过非典的警示，人们感到该医学模式不能最充分地反映更深层、更广泛的疾病病因。第三，它无法体现“人类基因组研究”以来，对生物医学再认识的大趋势。第四，该医学模式与包括生命伦理学和生态伦理学在内的现代伦理学发展缺乏内在的联系。第五，因高度、视野方面的原因，它限制了医学职能和医学目的的拓展。

健康医学是发展方向

对此，1993年一项名为《医学的目的国际研究计划》的报告有着深刻的认识。该报告指出：“当代世界性的医疗危机，根本上是由于主要针对疾病的技术统治医学的长期结果。” 为此，WHO在1996年出炉的《迎接21世纪的挑战》的报告中明确提出：“21世纪的医学，不应该继续以疾病为主要研究领域，应该把人类的健康作为医学的主要研究方向”。

在这种大背景下，陆广莘认为，医学面临着从化学的医学观上升到生命的医学观，从生物医学模式上升到人类医学模式，从疾病的医学上升到健康医学，从对抗医学上升到生态医学的发展取向。

对此，陆广莘有着深刻的认识。他表示，医学的目的和本质功能要从专注于发现和确诊疾病到征服和消灭疾病的疾病医学，上升为以发现和发展人的自我痊愈能力和自我健康能力为主旨的，为人类生命活动的生存健康发展服务的健康医学。这就需要解决人生存所必须的两个问题：(1)自我的整体保持稳态；(2)对环境的适应。

中医大有可为

而中医学，是在天人之际相互作用中，以人的健康生态和谐为目标，以对人的生生之气自我实现的健康能力和痊愈能力的认识，来决定其养生治疗实践和效果评价的医学。

其目的是调动人体内的自康复能力，而不是简单地用药物杀死病毒。1908年诺贝尔生理学或医学奖获得者俄国科学家梅奇尼科夫发现，锥虫红能杀死锥虫。可是如果杀死同量的锥虫，在人体内锥虫红的药量仅为实验室药量的1/6，那省去的5/6药量哪去了呢？“那是人体内的自康复能力。中医的精神就是发现这个5/6，依靠和发展这个5/6。这就是中西医的最大不同。”陆广莘说。中医的这种思想很好地符合了健康医学的观念。

因此，现代医学向健康医学模式的转变，无疑给中医药的发展提供了难得的机遇。陆广莘指出，中医的发展前景，英国《自然》杂志主编很早之前在接受新华社记者的采访时就已经有所阐述。当新华社记者问其21世纪科学发展的前沿和中国的机会时，该主编表示，21世纪科学的前沿就是生命科学与信息科学的交叉，而中国传统科学，尤其是中医，擅长的就是这个。

不 仅如此，相比于西医沉重的医疗负担，中医的医疗费用非常低廉，这就为中医在我国发展提供了巨大的空间。陆广莘一再强调，健康、教育是一个人生存发展的基 础，因此对于政府来说，首先要明确医疗是社会发展的一个指标，不能用市场、利润来分配，它要体现国家的意志，以政府行为来确保全民的健康长寿。其实，我国 能够以全球卫生总投入的1％，初步解决了全球22％人口的初级卫生保健问题，中医功不可没。

張翠容：從教育看衰退中的香港

一天到某中學演講，發現一個有趣的現象。

事緣是這樣的，我與高中同學分享對時事的心得，少不免觸及目前金融海嘯的來龍去脈，我好奇問出席的同學，誰有修讀經濟科？然後又問他們課程裏有否觸及馬克思政治經濟學？

經濟科的同學很熱烈發言，爭相舉手告訴我，他們學了甚麼，這倒令我留下深刻的印象。

在我向同學發問時，我表示了解問題之前，首先要掌握不同的觀點與角度，我認為香港中學課程太單一化，沒有提供多角度的思考，因此，我猜想經濟科也如是。

誰知同學們反駁我的看法，指他們在課程中雖無馬克思，但仍可讀到不少經濟學家的學說，然後逐一數出來，還特別提到張五常，他的產權論是會考必答的試題。

我忍不住笑了出來說，同學們，你們剛才所列舉的經濟學家全屬同一思想陣營，這包括張五常在內，都是新自由經濟學派，那又怎麼算是多角度？

同學們對馬克思學說一無所知，這是否因為有關部門認為馬克思等於共產黨，所以絕口不提，還是只希望培養經濟科同學將來可乖乖的為香港的自由經濟服務，不要太批判了。

從中學開始洗腦，不知大學的經濟系又如何？不過，從金融海嘯到香港的最低工資，來來去去只聽到芝加哥學派的雷鼎鳴教授在指指點點，似乎就沒有其他學派的經濟學家發表不同意見，難怪連中學生也發表最低工資會加劇失業等老掉牙的論調。

打開會考的經濟教科書，當中如何理解工資？這不外乎是一種價格，最低工資就是為價格設下限，此一舉動明顯是干預自由市場，要老闆多付工資，自然便要減人手啦！

但，現有的工資水平是否就等於市場工資，而勞動力和失業率又如何計算？中學課本實在有很多不足之處，而且好有問題。

香港雖然沒有民主，卻為擁有自由而感到驕傲，這包括言論自由、思想自由、資訊自由，想不到教科書卻扼殺了學生們學習多樣知識的自由和權利，在這方面與獨裁國家其實沒啥分別。

去年在古巴與一位當地年輕作家聊天，她好奇問我，馬克思主義以外的其他學說是怎樣的一回事？她表示自小只被教導一種主義，老師們都說這是唯一可行的主義， 而且是對人類最好的主義，可是有着求真之心的年輕人，怎會滿足於此，怎會甘心被洗腦？當主義變成教條，人類社會還會有進步嗎？

我以為在古巴及類似的地方才有此一經歷，怎知標榜自由的香港，也一樣做着同樣的洗腦事情。

我告訴學生們不要這樣傻啊，以為讀着好幾個經濟學家的思想就叫做多元化，讀來讀去也只有一套，這種教育不叫做洗腦，又叫做甚麼？

好了，我囑咐學生們小心被洗腦，在極權國家那種洗腦叫硬洗腦，在自由世界那種洗腦叫軟洗腦。過去八九十年代，全球便是給新自由主義在洗腦，傳媒在其中扮演着重要的角色。

我以半開玩笑的口吻說，趕快買本馬克思主義漫畫版看看吧，要追趕潮流呢！因為新自由主義瀕臨崩潰的邊緣，馬克思政治經濟學再度流行起來，歐洲那邊正在熱炒《資本論》。那麼同學們是否好應該也去了解一下 !

老實說，香港的學科變得太技術化，為甚麼香港每個範疇都是這麼浮淺？連政府領導層也一樣充斥着一大群技術官僚，哀哉，香港的衰退看來不止限於經濟這麼簡單！

明愛醫院合乎指引不近人情

【明報專訊】一個病人在明愛醫院門外心臟病發，就是因為只差幾步，沒有踏進醫院門內，結果醫院員工覑病人家屬致電999求救，病人在26分鐘後才送到急症室，最終不治。院方說員工是按指辦事，但這情猶如有人在警署門外遇劫，但警員卻覑你打999同樣荒謬。這個「引」的做法，實在太不合常理、不近人情，不能接受。

病人上周六下午2時43分到達明愛醫院門外的馬路，不支昏倒，病人兒子的朋友跑進醫院大堂，向詢問處一個文員求助。文員沒有通知急症室，反覑求助人打 999，其間醫院一個外科醫生經過，立即上前急救，並致電醫院急症室，但急症室沒有派人前來救助。病人在2時43分到醫院門外，幾經輾轉，2時53分消防急救人員到場，3時09分病人才被送到近在咫尺的急症室，足足花了26分鐘！

院方昨日解釋說，詢問處文員的做法沒有違反指引，在醫院門外有病人求助，應該覑他們致電999，因為派出急症室醫生到場要一段時間，現場亦與急症室有距離，致電999後救護人員可盡快到場。院方如此解釋實在難以令人接受。

醫院門外有人昏倒，醫院員工應如何做，實在不需要指引，當日途經現場協助救援的外科醫生韋樂申就做了最好的示範。

若根據指引，韋醫生根本毋須拔刀相助，一走了之也沒有人會怪他，但事實是韋醫生不單立即主動替病人施行體外心臟按摩，還致電急症室求助。醫護人員應盡之責，在韋醫生身上清楚看到——根據現場情，即使指引沒有規定要做的，也應立即施援。

要處理這次事件，按照常理，醫院員工應該立即聯絡急症室，看看可否派人來，又或是在醫院內找一張輪椅或擔架脇，送病人到急症室。據本報記者了解，從事發現場走到急症室，最多只是數分鐘路程，絕對不需要26分鐘，院方當日只要稍為變通，情已大大不同。

院方表示，日後要檢討若有病人在醫院附近求救，急症室應如何處理，這只是治標不治本之法，若以後指引說在醫院100米範圍內急症室要派人協助，那麼，病人在 101米外出事又如何？院方承認，這次若病人是在醫院範圍內昏倒，情會不同，原來是短短幾步之距令人陰陽相隔。除了「僵化」、「只按規則辦事」、「冷血」之外，實在難以找到其他詞彙來形容院方的思維。

制度是死的，人是活的，在制度之外靈活變通，盡力救活一條生命，這是作為一個人應盡的責任。這次事件，公眾實在看不到明愛醫院是盡了這個責任。

Review of Mark Leonard on Why Europe Will Run the 21st. Century

This book, published by Fourth Estate in 2005, is focused on the regionalizing aspect of ‘global influence’ and argues for the continued rise of European economic power and political influence and the relative decline of that of the United States. What is its thesis? How ought we to evaluate Leonard’s arguments?

The conventional view, according to Leonard, is that American power will hold good for another fifty years and then Asia will predominate, with India, and more especially China being the engines of world trade and the new superpowers. Leonard’s thesis is that American power has already shown serious signs of slipping. Its arsenal is huge; its willingness to threaten and to bully is based on this ‘hard power’ but its faith in the exercise of such power is over-confident, even misplaced. Branding states as rogue states and threatening them with military action is counter-productive. Such threats merely encourage them, as in the case of North Korea, in the very behavior that the United States is wishing to prevent. The more that the United States in its ‘war on terror’ attempts to exercise its military option, the more its ‘soft power’ (influence; diplomacy) is eroded. Indeed, the limits of American power are perfectly illustrated by the debacle in Iraq and by the fact that authoritative regimes in the Middle East have been reinforced rather than encouraged to change.

The power of the world’s most successful economic union, the EU, is of a different kind, according to Leonard. Whereas American power is ‘shallow and narrow’, that of the EU is ‘broad and deep’: ‘once sucked into its sphere of influence, countries are changed for ever’. Where America sees only ‘potential enemies’, Europe prefers to see ‘potential friends’. Leonard argues that it is the lack of a significant military option that has encouraged Europe to think of new ways of engaging the wider world. European power as experienced by and through the European Union is ‘transformative power’ accomplishing though negotiation and trade, democratic change in historically undemocratic nations. By operating through the existing ‘shell of political structures’ Europe has achieved a relatively silent political revolution within itself. The structures within the initial members remain the same but the key political process is that of a continuous engagement with other states within the European Union, a kind of ‘Network Europe’ (similar in function to the network that supports ‘Visa’). New states wishing to join participate in the process long before admission and are transformed as a result. Poland and Turkey and changes made in these countries are cited as part of the evidence for the existence of this ‘transformative power’. Key ideas are related to the development of European law: stable democratic institutions; the rule of law; human rights and a market economy. These changes are undertaken voluntary as a result of negotiation and diplomacy, whereas the changes in Iraq (such as they are) are imposed by force. At the same time, international companies are also regulated through changes in EU law, giving Europe a role in setting global regulatory standards. The model for further global developments, according to Leonard, is not that of the United States but rather regional groupings associated with Europe and constructed in similar ways.

China is on the rise and is starting to look at its own regional spheres of influence, aware of its need for sources of raw materials to further its industrial development. India is growing rapidly. The world cannot simply be run, Leonard argues, with out-of-date international institutions. The EU provides an effective model for increased regionalization. This has influenced the development of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States and Mexico. This is not, however, a politically popular agreement, as far as I can judge, and has little scope for further development. Demands for protectionism are likely to be on the rise in the United States, especially given the recent changes in the composition of the Congress. Newly elected Democrats are not necessarily trade friendly. Leonard sees a ‘post-America world’ to which America can chose to adapt by becoming more interested in international law and institutions, world opinion and the soft power options of negotiations and alliances or to which it can turn its back. Leonard sees the European way as becoming by adoption, and adaptation, the world way, with or without the United States.

This book paints with a large brush and on a very large canvas so it does not give as much attention to China as may be required or to any backsliding in EU members or potential members who were once in the Soviet bloc. It does not pay much attention to the reform process within Europe (agricultural policy; export subsidies; the drive for increased competitiveness though it is true that this process is underway) nor does it give enough attention to the confusion in Russia and the growing leverage Russia has over trade in gas and oil with respect to Western Europe and elsewhere. Nor does it look at cooperation and competition in Central Asia between Russia, China, the United States and Europe. A significant theme is on trade and on the next stages of globalization i.e. on the rise of regionalism leading, in Leonard’s view, to a world of regional units modeled, more or less, on the EU. Such a world looks more and more like a possible world, in my view, especially given the collapse of the Doha Round. These are no doubt weaknesses in the coverage. However, the strength of the book is found in contrasting the steady progress of EU ‘transformative power’ with the problems in the recent policy of the United States, including the erosion of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft power’ by the demands of the ‘war on terror’ as recently constructed. Leonard may overplay his hand but the book is an interesting read even if it is short on detail.

Posted by William Henderson on November 21, 2006

沈睿：《中国怎样想？》：中国改革思想的地形图

英国学者马克·里奥纳德的《中国怎样想？》是一本非常新的书。这种新，不仅仅是本书出版于今年――二月在英国，四月在美国，十一月在台湾翻译出版，而是因为内容新。这本书跟踪描述和详细讨论的是中国目前活跃的经济学家、思想家们的主要思想，这些有影响的中国知识分子直到2006-7年在做什么和想什么；以及他们的所做所想又怎样影响了中国政府的各种政策，影响了中国发展方向。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )
本书描述中国改革三十年来，特别是近十五年来中国改革过程中思想轨迹。全书共有五章。前言题为《思想解放》，讨论中国知识分子在中国社会和改革中的作用。这个题目不仅隐喻中国八十年代的思想解放，也隐喻崔之元于1993年的文章中提出的从对西方资本主义的无条件的羡慕的解放。结论为《中国围墙内的世界》，讨论中国未来的影响。其他三章分别题为《黄河资本主义》讨论中国的经济改革思想和变化；《云雾中的民主》讨论中国的政治改革试验；以及《综合国力》讨论中国军事和外交思想。从以上各个方面，这本书试图描绘中国的思想地形图，并为这个地形图标注了主要界标。这些主要界标就是中国思想舞台上有政治影响力的人物诸如张维迎、崔之元、甘阳、汪辉、王绍光、王小东、杨毅、郎闲评、潘维，潘岳、俞可平、郑必坚、阎学通等等。这些“新右”或“新左”、保守主义或自由主义的思想对中国政府实施的各种各样政策有深浅不同的影响，左右着中国进步的方向。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )
写作这本书的出发点，据里奥纳德说是首先是他个人与中国知识分子接触的经验。他第一次来到中国，来到中国社科院，才意识到中国有这么多知识分子，他们给改革出谋划策，他们自己对改革中的每一个问题，每一个步骤进行争论和争辩。他认为中国的知识分子，因为中国的特殊政治制度，其在社会的作用比西方一般意义的知识分子作用大得多。中国的知识分子是中国社会改变、经济改革发展的顾问和谋士。个人的经验使他意识到，西方看到中国的经济发展，但是对促成中国经济改革、社会变革的思想一无所知，对中国思想界和主要思想一无所知。西方往往从自己的角度看待中国，或是争论中国会不会走向民主，或是把中国还是看出一党专制的权威主义或极权主义国家，以为中国根本没有真正的知识分子等等。中国思想界在想什么？在辩论什么？在做什么？里奥纳德相信，不知道这些问题的答案，人们根本无法真正理解当代中国，也无法理解中国在世界上的作用。他说，中国不仅是一个日益崛起的经济超级大国，也日益成为一个政治超级大国。事实是，中国还应该被看成是一个思想超级大国，“在中国发展出来的很多设想将会对世界其他地方产生影响。”在本书的开篇，他说: “中国，已经加入美国和欧洲成为塑造世界秩序的一员”。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )
里奥纳德认为中国改革开放的最初十年是新右派思想占主导。新右知识分子提倡市场经济，认为中国必须一步步市场化；主张解体国家企业，反对计划经济；提倡“小政府”，认为政府应当缩权。这些主张在很大意义上都被中国政府采纳，所以经济改革进行得相当迅猛。但是，与此同时，另一派知识分子“新左派”也提出反对意见。他们的思想建立在中国的经济发展现有成效之上，认为要正视收入不均造成的贫富差距等问题。自2002年以来，中国政府的很多政策都向新左理论靠拢，强调关注老百姓，建设和谐社会等等。从新右与新左两个学派出发，里奥纳德试图描绘分析中国经济发展的道路和全球化过程中“中国模式”形成的过程。中国的经济改革，他详细分析了珠江资本主义（深圳）和黄河资本主义（南街）的两种模式和思想，探讨这两种模式的意义。中国的政治改体，他介绍分析了中国的村庄选举制度，平昌和重庆的民主管理试验，以及某些知识分子对法制的提倡和对选举的怀疑。他探讨中国的“渐进、从下到上的民主、党内民主、商议民主”各种模式，认为中国的一党政权已经发展出越来越成熟有效的技巧，在某种程度上听取民意，适应民心，实现民愿，以延续其生存，证明其合法化，防止民众不满情绪的滋生扩大。中国政府在保持一党制的原则上推进经济改革发展，在体制民主改革上做各种试验，试图找到自己的与民众沟通的道路。这种方向发展下去，“中国模式”会对世界其他非西方民主国家有怎样的意义？ ( http://www.tecn.cn )
本书对中国经济改革思想和政治改革试验和思想的描述，给对中国所知不多的人提供了一副相当清晰的“中国在想什么”的图画，给研究当代中国的学者和学生既提供了一副比较全面理解中国的景图，也突出介绍了参与中国政策决定的知识分子。里奥纳德非常注重从中国的角度理解中国，从中国的视野看世界。这对西方了解中国来说是非常重要的。西方的媒体比较容易关注中国持不同证见者的意见，但是对参与中国经济改革和社会变革的知识分子往往持有偏见，以为这些人就是为中国政府服务的，忽视这些人在中国变革中的作用。这本书没有站在西方喜欢站的道德高人一等的立场看中国知识分子，而是努力了解这些探索中的思想者，他们的观点和试验，他们的立场和对未来的设想，叙述得相当清楚。这本书为中国改革思想勾画了一副精确的地形图。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )
本书既没有暗示中国威胁论也没有提倡与中国的对抗，相反，本书强调在现行状态下与中国的合作。作者认为世界必须从中国的角度理解中国，认知中国在世界舞台的经济、政治和思想的地位。作者还提出要高度重视在全球化的过程中“中国模式”的意义，指出“中国模式”已经在世界产生影响，并将产生越来越大的影响。通过对中国知识分子思想的描述，作者质疑西方所相信的西方的民主和经济发展方式在中国的可能性。强调中国特色，作者相信二十一世纪中期将是三足鼎立的状态：中国、美国和欧洲将塑造一个新的世界。中国的思想者们在为此铺平道路。理解这些思想者和参与决策的人，将是理解中国未来的钥匙。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )
这本书关注的是对中国的现行政策能出谋划策的人的主要观点和思想，因此重点是经济、政治、军事和外交，对中国社会和文化方面的思想变革和讨论讨论得非常不够。其实一个国家的经济结构是最容易变革的，政治体制变革也不那么难。中国在1911年一夜之间就推翻了两千年的帝制，建立了共和。中国这三十年从铁板一块的计划经济走向资本主义，三十年不过是历史的一瞬。但是，中国社会的进步、民主的真正实现和取得，恐怕还是要在中国文化上有根本的变革。中国的文化变革在近三十年来是怎样发展的？中国思想者怎样考虑中国的文化身份的？也许是因为本书写作的目的是为西方战略研究提供资源，中国文化的变革不是重要的议题。因此本书没有对此着墨，虽说是一个遗憾，也是可以理解的。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )
马克·里奥纳德本人是一个长期战略研究思想库的执行主任。这个思想库的名字是“外交关系欧洲协会”(The European Council on Foreign Relations)，主要研究国际关系长期战略和近期政策等等。里奥纳德的第一本研究著作是关于欧洲的：《《欧洲为什么将主导二十一世纪？》（Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century?）。《中国怎样想？》是他的第二本书。 ( http://www.tecn.cn )

这是马克·里奥纳德的网址：http://markleonard.net, 里面有他的很多文章，可供参考。
What Does China Think？ Mark Leonard. Fourth Estate Ltd， 2008

12/8/2008

Why Europe Won't Be Running the 21st Century

February 26, 2007

For a number of years now the European think tank world has been busy churning out report after report with ever more grandiose proposals for turning the European Union into a global superpower.

One of the more provocative essays in this genre is titled ‘Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century', which was written by Mark Leonard of the London-based Centre for European Reform. Leonard's thesis is that Europe will dominate this century because it is based on a new understanding of power, which is embodied in the institutions and norms of the European Union. He argues that the economic, political and social models of the European Union are irresistibly attractive to the countries around it, and as they adopt the European economic and legal framework, they are transformed from the inside out. By contrast, Leonard asserts, even though the United States might be able to use its military power to change regimes, it cannot change societies, and thus it is weak when compared to the ‘transformative' power of the European Union. This is why Europe will dominate the 21st century, or so Leonard would have us believe.

But is Europe really destined to become a global superpower? A growing body of research says no. Indeed, overwhelming evidence supports the view that contemporary Europe is beset by a mix of problems that is so complex, that apart from dramatic changes in public policy, Europe is headed toward certain decline, not ascendancy.

Demographic Collapse?

Although European elites imagine that their political and social models are so obviously attractive that they will be adopted by the rest of the world, ordinary Europeans don't seem to think so. In fact, demographic trends suggest that most Europeans don't even believe in the European ideal in sufficient numbers to want to pass it on to the next generation.

According to the European Commission, the average birth rate for the European Union as a whole is now 1.4 children per woman, which is well below the 2.1 replacement rate. By way of example, the country with lowest fertility rate in the world is Spain, where women have an average of only 1.07 children.

As a result, deaths will start out-numbering births in every member state of the European Union by as early as 2010. But some countries have already reached that point. According to Germany's Federal Statistics Office, more people died in that country in 2005 than were born. And Germany's demographic decline is the norm, not the exception in Europe. Indeed, Europe's population is forecast to decrease by more than 100 million by 2050.

But not only are Europeans declining in number, they are aging as well. According to the US Census Bureau, Europe in 2000 had the highest percentage of people aged 65 and older, and this figure is set to double by 2050.

Economic Uncertainty

Why should Europeans be worried about declining birth rates and aging populations? Economic stability is one reason. A shrinking workforce will find it increasingly difficult to pay for the rising costs of ever more retirees. Indeed, economists predict that European budget deficits will balloon as governments strain to reconcile declining tax bases with millions of elderly people who force up spending on pensions and health care.

But that's not all. German business leaders, for example, are already worried that the population decline with hurt their country's competitiveness. German demographers predict that by 2030, their country will have 7 million fewer people of working age than today, but 8.5 million more people of retirement age. So although today there are two workers supporting each retiree, within one generation the ratio will be one-to-one. Many economists say this will spell the end of the European social welfare state as we know it. And because Germany is Europe's largest economy, it serves as the benchmark for Europe as a whole.

Political Instability

As European countries edge closer to a pension crisis, political stability is another reason why Europeans should be concerned. Germany, for example, was brought to a standstill more than once by citizens protesting the Harz IV reform package. The aim of those reforms was to reduce payouts to unemployed people and to make it more difficult for them to refuse job offers. Although the government held firm, it was also voted out of office. In any case, two years later there is still no sign that the reforms have made Germany's stagnant economy any more competitive.

Economic frustrations among French and Dutch voters also contributed to their rejecting the European Constitution. Indeed, European citizens seem unwilling to sacrifice their social security benefits on the altar of further European integration. Der Spiegel, the leftwing German news magazine, recently ran a story in which it observed:

"Europe has become a continent of political crises with governments in Italy, France, Britain and Poland all suffering from paralysis or a lack of voter approval. Is the continent about to abandon its integration project and return to the old era of national rivalry?"

Geo-Political Decline

Europe's demographic situation is in stark contrast to that of the United States, where the population officially passed the 300 million mark in October 2006. The United States is now the third most populous country in the world, behind China and India. Moreover, the United States is growing faster than any other industrialized nation... in fact, it is virtually the only developed country expected to grow this century. All analysts agree that America's demographic dynamism will have major geo-political implications, especially for Europe.

Some Europeans are beginning to acknowledge this reality. The Paris-based EU Institute for Security Studies predicts that by 2025, Europe will represent only six percent of the world's population and that its relative share of global wealth and trade will have shrunk. It says that

‘the ongoing debate on the future of Europe suffers from a lack of perspective on the global developments that are changing the context of European integration itself...the risk is that the Union and its Member States will be increasingly subject to, rather than agents of, change.'

The False Promise of Immigration

How did the United States, which turned 230 years old in July 2006, get so big so fast? American growth has been fuelled by a combination of economic stability, high birth rates and immigration. Indeed, the United States is the largest immigrant-receiving country in the world. Some 50 percent of the 100 million newest Americans are recent immigrants or their descendents.

Europe, however, is also a magnet for immigration: It will attract up to 1 million newcomers this year. But the European experience with immigration is quite different from that of America. Part of the reason is that many immigrants to Europe end up on welfare, while in the United States, almost all immigrants take one or more entry-level jobs and work their way up the economic ladder. Welfare is simply not the American way.

Islamic Conquest of Europe?

Moreover, most immigrants to the United States are fully integrated into American society by the second generation, regardless of their country of origin. By contrast, most immigrants to Europe are Muslims who refuse to assimilate and instead tend to cluster in marginalized ghettos on the outskirts of cities across the continent.

Here, too, the American experience is quite different. The best available estimates show that there are between 1.9 million and 2.8 million Muslims in the United States. And unlike their European counterparts, American Muslims generally do not feel marginalized or isolated from political participation. According to a 2004 Zogby Poll, American Muslims are more educated and affluent than the national average, with 59 percent of them holding at least an undergraduate college degree. Moreover, the majority of American Muslims are employed in professional fields, with one in three having an income over $75,000 a year.

But back to Europe: The Muslim population of Europe has more than doubled since 1980, and according to some estimates, there are some 25 million Muslims living on the continent today. Demographers predict that this figure may double by 2015, and that the number of Muslims could outnumber non-Muslims in all of Western Europe by mid-century. This prompted Princeton University's Bernard Lewis to tell the German newspaper Die Welt that ‘Europe will be Islamic by the end of the century.'

This reality is already influencing European foreign policymaking and does not auger well for the future of transatlantic relations. Indeed, many analysts believe that the steady weakening of Europe is the underlying cause for the widespread anti-American and anti-Israel bigotry found among Europe's elites, many of whom are bowing to pressure from Muslim residents as a way to buy a fake peace with radical Islamists. Says Fouad Ajami, a well-known authority of the Arab world: ‘In ways both intended and subliminal, the escape into anti-Americanism is an attempt at false bonding with the peoples of Islam.'

A European Crisis of Spirit

Some analysts believe that what ails Europe is not primarily a crisis of demography, but rather a crisis of spirit. Michael Novak of the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute (AEI) says that in their blind pursuit of reason, secularism and materialism,

"European elites have done their withering best to empty Europe of its Christian spirit. They have swept Europe clean just in time for the rapid rise of a rival faith [Islam] prolific with children, vitality, passion and confidence in long-term victory."

But by removing Judaism and Christianity from European cultural, intellectual and public life, secular Europeans are largely responsible for the lack of confidence ordinary Europeans have in the future. Indeed, the lack of faith not only in tomorrow-but also in God-begets hopelessness. And without hope for the future, one is less likely to want to bring children into the world.

Will Europe Become More Like America?

Most economists agree that demographic decline goes hand in hand with economic decline, and that economic decline, by definition, leads to a loss of influence on the global stage. Although European elites dream about a day when Europe will act as a counterbalance to the United States, the facts imply that Europe's future will be considerably more modest.

There are solutions to almost every problem facing Europe today. But ironically, those solutions imply that Europe must become more (not less) like the United States in its political, economic and social models.

That is to say, as long as European elites insist on building a Europe whose main purpose is to check American power, Europeans are certain to lose over the long run. But if they can bring their ambitions more into line with reality, both Europeans and Americans are set to win.

Soeren Kern is Senior Analyst for Transatlantic Relations at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group.